Quote:I hope people try to see your frame of thought here. For you, people are simply servants of the State in which their privacy can be violated at will. People who share your thinking are the antithesis to freedom.

Quote:The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and the product of other men’s labor. Here are two, not only different, but incompatable things, called by the same name—liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and incompatable names—liberty and tyranny.

The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep’s throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the same act as the destroyer of liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly the sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word liberty; and precisely the same difference prevails to-day among us human creatures, even in the North, and all professing to love liberty. Hence we behold the processes by which thousands are daily passing from under the yoke of bondage, hailed by some as the advance of liberty, and bewailed by others as the destruction of all liberty. Recently, as it seems, the people of Maryland have been doing something to define liberty; and thanks to them that, in what they have done, the wolf’s dictionary, has been repudiated.

Quote:It is not about a terrorist attack. it is protecting the rights of a person. Of course the act he did was terrible, it gives you no right on threatening every Apple device in existence. You are telling me you would want Apple to make something to invade one persons rights, while risking millions more in the process?

(02-18-2016, 05:28 AM)BoFox Wrote: Well, what seems to be the case is that the government does not have a problem with finding terrorists or other hardcore criminals with whatever encryption methods they use in the US.  If that is actually the case, then case aside, it's a good thing that we can use encryption to protect ourselves not from the government, but rather from the corporations that are increasingly snooping around in our lives, like with Microsoft and their Cortana "universal A.I. in the birthing", Apple, Google, Verizon, AT&T,  etc.

Quote:“I will, free of charge, decrypt the information on the San Bernardino phone, with my team,” he writes. “We will primarily use social engineering, and it will take us three weeks. If you accept my offer, then you will not need to ask Apple to place a backdoor in its product, which will be the beginning of the end of America.”

Quote:In 2012, when asked if he personally uses McAfee anti-virus, he replied: "I take it off," and, "It's too annoying."[27]

Quote:An Apple executive says this move by the DOJ is simply an attempt to argue its case in the court of public opinion, Reuters reports — ironic when you consider that’s essentially what the DOJ is accusing Apple of doing. Another Apple exec said Congress should be taking up the issue, not the courts.
...
Apple has also noted that it attempted to help the FBI with the initial investigation by accessing the data on Farook’s iPhone in conventional ways. For example, if it’s on a trusted Wi-Fi network, the iPhone can automatically back up its data, allowing it to be intercepted. However, the new filing reveals that the FBI made this impossible when it asked the city of San Bernardino to reset the Apple ID associated with the phone (it was Farook’s work device). This prevents the phone from backing up its data until authenticated with the unlock PIN. Some might even suggest this was an intentional move to set up the tussle over encryption, which the DOJ hopes it can win and use to set a precedent.

Quote:The Obama administration told a US magistrate judge on Friday it would be willing to allow Apple Inc. to retain possession of and later destroy specialized software it has been ordered to design to help the FBI hack into an encrypted iPhone used by the gunman in December’s mass shootings in California.

The government made clear that it was open to less intrusive options in a new legal filing intended to blunt public criticism by Apple’s chief executive, Tim Cook, who said the software would be “too dangerous to create” because it would threaten the digital privacy of millions of iPhone customers worldwide.

“Apple may maintain custody of the software, destroy it after its purpose under the order has been served, refuse to disseminate it outside of Apple and make clear to the world that it does not apply to other devices or users without lawful court orders,” the Justice Department told Judge Sheri Pym. “No one outside Apple would have access to the software required by the order unless Apple itself chose to share it.”

Quote:PALO ALTO, California (AP) -- In its fight with the FBI, Apple insists it's defending the privacy and safety of all iPhone users by resisting government calls to help unlock an extremist's iPhone. And now other big tech companies such as Google and Facebook are rallying to Apple's side.

Wait just a minute: Aren't those the same companies that Apple has previously criticized by lobbing veiled accusations that they exploit your personal information - to sell ads - and effectively endanger your privacy?

Some might argue that Apple's allies are hypocrites when it comes to privacy, much like the fraternity brothers in "Animal House" who declared: "He can't do that to our pledges. Only we can do that to our pledges."

But Silicon Valley's view of privacy is more nuanced than that. And Americans historically have worried less about the private sector and more about the government's power to infringe on individual rights.

"The government can put me in jail," said Larry Downs, a scholar at Georgetown University's Center for Business and Public Policy. "Google, Facebook and Twitter cannot."
...
The same companies objected loudly after former government contractor Edward Snowden revealed the scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that collected user data and even tapped their networks without their knowledge. The companies have gone to court and Congress to limit that kind of government data-gathering, while also fighting attempts to weaken the encryption codes that shield your messages from prying eyes.

Yet privacy advocates have long complained that those companies reap billions of dollars by collecting all kinds of personal information, including records of customers' online behavior, and using it to target them for advertising.

Apple CEO Tim Cook has leveled jabs at his competitors, boasting that Apple doesn't rely on ad revenue for most of its services. As he's said more than once: "When an online service is free, you're not the customer. You're the product."

But even Apple collects some customer information. Experts say it's not really clear if Apple's privacy stance is a big selling point for most consumers.

Quote:On October 10, 2014, the Government obtained a search warrant that authorized the Government to search the contents of a cellular telephone for evidence relating to credit card fraud. The cellphone had previously been seized incident to an arrest. The Government now reports that the phone is "locked" — apparently requiring a password to retrieve any of the information permitted under the search warrant. It has made an ex parte application pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, seeking an order that would compel the manufacturer of the cellphone to assist in the execution of the search warrant by "bypassing the lock screen." Both the search warrant and the current application have been filed under seal.
...
The Supreme Court case that most directly supports the application here is United States v. New York Telephone Co. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a district court had authority under the All Writs Act to issue an order requiring a telephone company to provide technical assistance to the Government in its effort to install a "pen register" — a device for recording the numbers dialed on a telephone. 434 U.S. at 172-75. It held that such an order was in aid of the district court's jurisdiction under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 to issue a search warrant. Id. at 168-70. New York Telephone Co. made clear that

Quote:[t]he power conferred by the Act extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice, and encompasses even those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice.

Id. at 174. (internal citations omitted); accord Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of Conn., Inc. v. Thorne, 30 F.3d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1994) (court "may require the compliance of nonparties in order to ensure that its legally-mandated directives are not frustrated"); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 338 (2d Cir. 1985) (same). Thus, we conclude that it is appropriate to order the manufacturer here to attempt to unlock the cellphone so that the warrant may be executed as originally contemplated. See United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1238 (D. Colo. 2012) (order issued under All Writs Act requiring defendant to provide password to encrypted computer seized pursuant to a search warrant).
...
We are mindful that the "the power of federal courts to impose duties upon third parties is not without limits." N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172. Thus, a court may not impose "[u]nreasonable burdens" upon them. Id.; accord United States v. Doe, 537 F. Supp. 838, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (All Writs Act extends to third parties only when the requested assistance is not "burdensome"). Case law reflects that orders providing technical assistance of the kind sought here are often not deemed to be burdensome.
...
For the foregoing reasons, and with the foregoing modification, the Government's application for an order under the All Writs Act is granted.

Quote:If Apple determines that it can achieve the three functions stated above in paragraph 2, as well as the functionality set forth in paragraph 3, using an alternate technological means from that recommended by the government, and the government concurs, Apple may comply with this Order in that way.

Quote:Exactly. It's the corporations I don't trust.

Quote:The SIF will be loaded on the SUBJECT DEVICE at either a government facility, or alternatively, at an Apple facility; if the latter, Apple shall provide the government with remote access to the SUBJECT DEVICE through a computer allowing the government to conduct passcode recovery analysis.

(02-28-2016, 06:41 AM)SteelCrysis Wrote: no the government cannot simply put you in jail.

Quote:Newsroom drama detailing the 2004 CBS 60 Minutes report investigating then-President George W. Bush's military service, and the subsequent firestorm of criticism that cost anchor Dan Rather and producer Mary Mapes their careers.

Quote:Anyone viewing the authoritative Thornburgh-Boccardi report online (easily obtained via Google) and working through its 220+ pages can hardly deny The Truth about Rather and Mapes. Their report was fraudulent, and failed to meet even the lowest, most basic standards for responsible journalism.

Now, as is the case with so many liberal media celebrities (recall Doris Kearns Goodwin's rehabilitation a few years after she was caught plagiarizing -- she blamed it on her assistants and paid off the person whose writing she appropriated), Rather and Mapes are going to try to rewrite history and rehabilitate themselves.

In the midst of a swelling musical score and convincing acting (remember, it is acting, to a script), the naive person might actually believe Redford's account of RatherGate.

The more critical-minded person might start by asking the following question: If Rather would commit such a massive lie in 2004, would there be any other occasions on which he also lied publicly?

The answer is, of course, "Yes." It is all there on the internet. Simply Google "Mark Lane exposes Dan Rather" and view a detailed article showing that Dan has been lying, in public, in crucial circumstances, from very early in his career. Shortly after the Kennedy assassination, Dan Rather became one of the very few people to view the Zapruder film, which was then not available to the general public.

Dan appeared on CBS TV to give a detailed description of what he saw on the film. Dan described Kennedy's head as moving "violently forward" when the crucial head shot hit Kennedy at frame 313. Of course, as any assassination buff knows, the head moved violently backward! Mark Lane synchronized audio of Dan's commentary with the movie of the head shot and showed it in the 1970's to audiences of college students. He repeated the sequence several times, and the audience first gasped, then started laughing at Rather's outrageous effrontery.

So there was Rather, looking grave, serious, and sad, staring in the camera and telling a lie! Note, this is what Lyndon Johnson wanted Rather to say, because it supported the notion that Kennedy had been shot from behind. Rather had known Johnson since 1955, and Johnson had cultivated him carefully.

Now, future analysis showed that, although Kennedy's head DID move violently backward, and Rather was lying, this was not necessarily inconsistent with a head shot from behind. But Rather didn't know that at the time.

At the time, I had considered Rather a hero, a courageous journalist, based on the way he'd gone after Nixon after Watergate. But after attending Lane's presentation, I saw Rather in a different light.

Dan Rather -- getting things wrong since 1963 (at least).

Dan has an "explanation" for this too. Tell me, did this event or Dan's explanation make it into "Truth"? If Redford and Mapes are so interested in "Truth", why wouldn't they present this rather powerful evidence about the reliability of Rather?

Bill Gates Wrote:I think there needs to be a discussion about when the government should be able to gather information. What if we had never had wiretapping? Also the government needs to talk openly about safeguards. Right now a lot of people don't think the government has the right checks to make sure information is only used in criminal situations. So this case will be viewed as the start of a discussion. I think very few people take the extreme view that the government should be blind to financial and communication data but very few people think giving the government carte blanche without safeguards makes sense. A lot of countries like the UK and France are also going through this debate. For tech companies there needs to be some consistency including how governments work with each other. The sooner we modernize the laws the better.

Quote:Maybe they could propose an overall plan for striking the balance between government being able to know things in some cases and having safeguards to make sure those powers are confined to appropriate cases. There is no avoiding this debate and they could contribute to how the balance should be struck.

Quote:Apple speculates that if it submits to a lawful order to assist with a constitutional, warranted search of a consenting customer’s phone in America, Apple will have no choice but to help totalitarian regimes suppress dissidents around the globe, and “hackers, criminals, and foreign agents” will have access to the data on millions of iPhones. (Opp. 1-2, 28.) This putative public burden, Apple argues, is a basis to relieve it from the Order. Apple’s fears are overblown for reasons both factual and legal.

To begin with, many of the most compelling examples of cybercrime that Apple describes involve not breaches of physical-device security, but rather breaches of network security. That is the “the daily siege” of “hackers, cyber-criminals, and foreign agents” with which the government and victims contend. (Opp. 1.) Nothing in the Court’s Order affects Apple’s network security. Rather, the features at issue concern only access to a physical device. Thus, for the government even to benefit from the software set forth in the Order, it first had to recover Farook’s iPhone itself. (Perino Decl. ¶¶ 6.c, 31-36.) That fact alone eliminates much of Apple’s worry. Next, contrary to Apple’s stated fears, there is no reason to think that the code Apple writes in compliance with the Order will ever leave Apple’s possession. Nothing in the Order requires Apple to provide that code to the government or to explain to the government how it works. And Apple has shown it is amply capable of protecting code that could compromise its security. For example, Apple currently protects (1) the source code to iOS and other core Apple software and (2) Apple’s electronic signature, which as described above allows software to be run on Apple hardware. (Hanna Decl. Ex. DD at 62-64 (code and signature are “the most confidential trade secrets [Apple] has”).) Those—which the government has not requested—are the keys to the kingdom. If Apple can guard them, it can guard this.

Even if “criminals, terrorists, and hackers” somehow infiltrated Apple and stole the software necessary to unlock Farook’s iPhone (Opp. 25), the only thing that software could be used to do is unlock Farook’s iPhone. (Perino Decl. ¶¶ 6.a, 18-24.) Far from  being a master key, the software simply disarms a booby trap affixed to one door: Farook’s. The software “will be coded by Apple with a unique identifier of the phone so that the [software] would only load and execute on the SUBJECT DEVICE [i.e., Farook’s iPhone].” (Order ¶ 3.) This phone-specific limitation was not dreamed up by the government, but instead employs Apple’s well-publicized security paradigm. A “unique ID (ECID)” associated with each physical iPhone is incorporated into the  phone’s operating system. (Perino Decl. ¶ 20; Hanna Decl. Ex. K at 6.) “Adding the ECID ‘personalizes’ the authorization for the requesting device.” ( Id .) Apple has designed its phones so that every operating system must pair with the phone’s ECID. (Perino Decl. ¶¶ 18-24; Hanna Decl. Ex. K at 6 (describing how the Apple server “adds the ECID” before it “signs” the iOS to be used for the upgrade).) The operating system and ECID must correspond for the operating system to work. The ordered software would rely upon the same limitation.

Apple implies that the code could be modified to run on other phones, but a second Apple security layer prevents that from happening: Apple devices will only run software that is electronically “signed” by Apple. (Hanna Decl. Ex. K at 6 (“only Apple-signed code can be installed on a device”).) “Signing” the software described in the Order will not release Apple’s signature to the government or anyone else—Apple signs all publicly available iOS software, but that does not disclose the signature itself. (Perino Decl. ¶¶ 9, 13-17, 24, 28.) And if the code were modified to run on a phone with a different ECID, it would lack a valid digital signature. Without that signature, the code would not run at all on any iOS phone with intact security. ( Id.) Thus, it is simply not  plausible that Apple’s complying with the Order would cripple iPhone security. Similarly misleading is Apple’s argument that the Order will force Apple to  provide access to data to foreign governments. As a legal matter, the Order does not—could not—compel Apple to follow or disregard the laws of foreign countries. The  pressure of foreign law on Apple flows from its decision to do business in foreign countries, not from the Order. Apple suggests that, as a practical matter, it will cease to resist foreign governments’ efforts to obtain information on iPhone users if this Court rules against it. It offers no evidence for this proposition, and the evidence in the public record raises questions whether it is even resisting foreign governments now. For example, according to Apple’s own data, China demanded information from Apple regarding over 4,000 iPhones in the first half of 2015, and Apple produced data 74% of the time. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 8 at 3.) Apple appears to have made special accommodations in China as well: for example, moving Chinese user data to Chinese government servers, and installing a different WiFi protocol for Chinese iPhones. (See Wilkison Decl. Ex. 9 (reporting that in August 2014, Apple moved Chinese users’ iCloud data onto state-owned servers); Ex. 10 (reporting that Apple produced a modified iPhone for sale in mainland China that used a “WAPI” WiFi standard as required by the Chinese government); Ex. 11 (reporting Apple was the first Western company to have its  products use WAPI and “[t]hus, [Apple] is presumably sharing confidential information with the [Chinese] government”).) Such accommodations provide Apple with access to a huge, and growing, market. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 12.) This Court’s Order changes neither the carrots nor the sticks that foreign governments can use on Apple. Thus, it does not follow that if America forgoes Apple’s assistance in this terrorism investigation, Apple will refuse to comply with the demands of foreign governments. Nor does it follow that if the Court stands by its Order, Apple must yield to foreign demands, made in different circumstances without the safeguards of American law.

Quote:Even if the Court ordered Apple to provide the government with Apple’s cryptographic keys and source code, Apple itself has implied that the government could not disable the requisite features because it “would have insufficient knowledge of Apple’s software and design protocols to be effective.” (Neuenschwander Decl. ¶ 23.)

Rather than acknowledge this point, Apple instead blames the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health and the FBI. Apple argues that the FBI could have gained access to some of the information via a forced backup to Farook’s iCloud account, but since the FBI changed the iCloud password to gain quick access to what was stored in previous backups in the immediate aftermath of the San Bernardino shooting, this path was blocked. (Opp. 11.) That is both untrue and irrelevant. For several reasons, a forced iCloud backup would not have been successful even if the password had remained unchanged. Farook’s iPhone was found powered off. (Supp. Pluhar Decl. ¶ 2.) Subsequent testing has revealed that once powered off, an iPhone will not back itself up to an iCloud account unless and until it has been unlocked at least once by use of the passcode. (Perino Decl. ¶¶ 6.d, 37-39.) Moreover, the evidence on Farook’s iCloud account suggests that he had already changed his iCloud password himself on October 22, 2015—shortly after the last backup—and that the auto-backup feature was disabled. (Pluhar Decl. ¶ 8; Supp. Pluhar Decl. ¶ 9.)

A forced backup of Farook’s iPhone was never going to be successful, and the decision to obtain whatever iCloud evidence was immediately available via the password change was the reasoned decision of experienced FBI agents investigating a deadly terrorist conspiracy. Moreover, even if—contrary to how Apple built and designed it—Farook’s iPhone could have been forced to sync to Apple’s iCloud network, that would not be an adequate substitute to unlocking and searching the phone itself. Both the FBI’s testing and Apple’s security documentation show that entire categories of evidence—including device-level data such as the “keyboard cache” (which records recent keystrokes)—reside only on the iPhone and not on an iCloud backup, and that some of the backup data would still have been encrypted. (Supp. Pluhar Decl. ¶ 10.) But that data remains on the iPhone. Thus, even with a full set of backups, the government still would have needed to search the phone itself in order to leave no stone unturned in this important investigation.

Most importantly, even assuming counterfactually that something could have been recovered through a forced iCloud backup, there have been no backups since October 19, 2015, and Apple concedes there is no way to force a backup now. Thus, the only way to recover any subsequent data—whether subject to backup or otherwise—is to unlock Farook’s iPhone. And for the FBI to do that, Apple must remove the barriers it put on that phone.

(02-24-2016, 05:31 AM)SteelCrysis Wrote: http://www.maximumpc.com/apple-explains-its-fbi-stance-in-new-faq/
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers/
And as predicted, Apple continues to stick its head in the sand. If they're so concerned about cyberattacks, don't fucking let the compromised OS installer be stored on the fucking network to begin with. Have the entire install done on a sandbox that is not connected to the network. Don't tell me that Apple can't implement basic, elementary network security. Don't tell me that Apple can't do something that is the standard procedure for responding to suspicious USB flash drives. Also, I love its alternative: create a panel that they can presumably influence with lobbyists.

Quote:Even if the Court ordered Apple to provide the government with Apple’s cryptographic keys and source code, Apple itself has implied that the government could not disable the requisite features because it “would have insufficient knowledge of Apple’s software and design protocols to be effective.” (Neuenschwander Decl. ¶ 23.)